This settles the central open question in algorithmic mechanism design which, since its inception, has been focused on trying to show the hardness of polynomial time incentive compatibility. Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. In the past decade, a theory of manipulation-robust algorithms has been emerging to address the challenges that frequently occur in strategic environments such as the internet. Mechanisms for Fair Attribution. The theory, known as algorithmic mechanism design, builds on the foundations of classical mechanism design from microeconomics and is based on the idea of incentive compatible protocols. Minimizing a Submodular Function from Samples. Papadimitriou , Yaron Singer:
Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets. Christos Papadimitriou BibTeX citation: Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru , Christos H. Yaron Singer , Avinatan Hassidim: WWW Companion Volume Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects. Eric Balkanski , Yaron Singer:
Elchanan MosselThesia H. Optimization for Approximate Submodularity. On the Hardness of Being Truthful. Yaron SingerAvinatan Hassidim: Mechanisms for Fair Attribution.
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Yaron SingerManas Mittal: Budget feasible mechanism design. Submodular Optimization under Noise. Ashwinkumar BadanidiyuruChristos H.
Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets.
Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions. The Importance of Communities for Learning to Influence.
dblp: Yaron Singer
SIGecom Exchanges 15 1: Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions. Information-theoretic lower bounds for convex optimization with erroneous oracles. We show that for a broad class of these problems, there are incentive compatible mechanisms with desirable approximation guarantees that do not require overpayments.
How to win friends and influence people, truthfully: Robust Influence Maximization yafon Hyperparametric Models.
Learning on a budget: Maximization of Approximately Submodular Functions. This settles the central open question in algorithmic mechanism design which, since its inception, has been focused on trying sknger show the hardness of polynomial time incentive compatibility. Minimizing a Submodular Function from Samples.
The adaptive complexity of maximizing a submodular function. Robust Guarantees of Stochastic Greedy Algorithms.
By resulting to approximations, this result circumvents well known impossibility results from classical mechanism design theory that deem incentive compatibility to be infeasible under a budget. Lior SeemanYaron Singer: Christos Papadimitriou BibTeX citation: PapadimitriouYaron Singer: Robust Classification of Financial Risk.
Yuval ShavittYaron Singer: Avinatan HassidimYaron Singer: Eric BalkanskiYaron Singer: Sinher QianYaron Singer: Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.